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CHRISTOPHER B. HYNES, CARRIE NEWTON LYONS AND ANDREW WEBER*
I. Afghanistan: One War, Two Mandates
While U.S. strategic thinking and public debate are fixed on the challenges posed by the
situation in Iraq, recent developments in Afghanistan have brought to light several new
and unresolved national security issues. A major 2006 study on current conditions in Af-
ghanistan concluded that "[flive years after their removal from power, the Taliban is back
and has strong psychological and defacto military control over half of Afghanistan."' Re-
cently, the British commander of NATO troops in Afghanistan said, "If you said to me, if
your aim is to win, I'd say no. I haven't got enough [troops] (to) win this, say, in the next
six months .... " 2 This is a significant statement. Its significance is couched in the answer
to the question: win what? What is NATO's objective in Afghanistan? Upon what basis is
NATO's mission legitimized, and what does the United Nations' delegation of the use of
armed force to the North Atlantic regional alliance in South-Central Asia portend for
future international armed interventions?
One particular source of legal ambiguity in the era of failed states and states "captured"
by illegitimate or repressive regimes is the authorization by the Security Council of the
use of force by individual Member States, or a group of States, by way of delegated en-
forcement action. Moreover, in the post-9/11 international environment, the legality of
the use of armed force is further complicated by whether international law governing self-
defense can be stretched to fit new and changing circumstances of self-defense and pre-
emption. 3 Specifically, the legal question is whether there is a point at which the grant of
delegated authority from the Security Council confers a pseudo-legitimacy upon military
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1. SENLIS COUNCIL, Executive Summary, in AFCIIANIsAN FIVE YEARs LATER: ToE RETURN OF THE
TALIBAN (2006), available at http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/014-publication.
2. NATO Force Not Big Enough for Quick Victory: British General, DEFENSENEWS, Nov. 1, 2006, available at
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2325790&C=landwar (quoting Lieutenant-General David
Richards).
3. See Richard Falk, Legality to Legitimacy: The Revival of the Just War Framework, 26 HARV. INT'L REV. 1,
1 (2004), available at http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/l 215/.
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operations that have political objectives that are eventually unrelated to the original
mandate. 4
There are currently two major active military operations in Afghanistan. One is the
U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom; the other is the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force (NATO-ISAF). These operations share a number of similarities in purs-
ing their respective objectives of counterterrorism (Operation Enduring Freedom) and
enforced stabilization (NATO-ISAF). Notwithstanding these similarities, Operation En-
during Freedom and NATO-ISAF were initiated upon different legal bases, with different
mission mandates and rules of engagement, and different mission objectives, while the
nature of their respective missions originally determined the areas of Afghanistan in which
they operated. 5 Both missions have, however, considerably altered since they were first
established in 2001. This has led to increasingly blurred distinctions between the two
missions, which are now both predominantly focused on combating insurgents opposed to
a Western-backed government. With NATO-ISAF's recent expansion into southern Af-
ghanistan and its consequent absorption of several thousand former Operation Enduring
Freedom British and Canadian troops, it is virtually impossible to differentiate between
the two military operations. 6
The American-led operation was legally grounded, in part, as a response to the armed
attacks of September 11, 2001, responsibility for which attached to the then defacto Af-
ghan government, and partly as an action by way of anticipatory self-defense to extirpate
sources of terrorism in the future.7 This latter justification raises murky legal issues be-
cause it is difficult to bring forcible regime change within the concepts of self-defense,
pre-emption, or the promotion of national self-determination and popular sovereignty.
Moreover, it raises the question of whether the objective of extirpation justifies a regime
of occupation unlimited in time.8
The first Security Council Resolution adopted after the September 11, 2001, attacks
refers expressly to "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance
4. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 709 (6th ed. 2003).
5. S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001). See also S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). The Resolutions recognize and reaffirm, respectively, the inherent right of individual
and collective self-defense as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations. Resolution 1386 states:
Determined to ensure the full implementation of the mandate of the International Security Assis-
tance Force, in consultation with the Afghan Interim Authority established by the Bonn Agree-
ment, Acting for these reasons under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Authorizes, as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for 6 months
of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the
maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim
Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure
environment.
S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001).
6. SENLIS COUNCIL, Afghanistan's Instability and the Return of the Taliban, in AFGHANIsTAN, FIvEF YEARs
LATFER: THE REl URN OF THE TALIBAN, at 5, http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/publications/014
publication.
7. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1386 and 1373 both recognize the principle of self-defense and call
on the international community to redouble their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts by full imple-
mentation of the relevant international anti-terrorist conventions and Security Council resolutions. See S.C.
Res. 1368, supra note 5; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 5.
8. BROWNLIE, snpra note 4, at 713-14.
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with the [U.N.] Charter."9 The United States took the position that the defacto govern-
ment of Afghanistan, the Taliban regime, was complicit, thereby justifying military force
in order to remove that government and dismantle the al Qaeda terrorist organization
who, with their Afghan supporters, were held responsible for the September 11, 2001,
attacks (as well as previous attacks on the United States).10 In principle, such action has an
independent legal basis in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which recognizes a Member
State's "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.""
Thus, Operation Enduring Freedom was launched on October 7, 2001, when the
United States and Britain notified the U.N. Security Council that the mission was an
exercise of individual and collective self-defense in compliance with the terms of Article 51
of the U.N. Charter.' 2 The initial military objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom, as
articulated by President George W. Bush in his September 20, 2001, Address to a Joint
Session of Congress 13 and his October 7, 2001, address to the United States,' 4 included
the destruction of terrorist training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan, the cap-
ture of al Qaeda leaders, and the cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan.' 5
Subsequently, in October 2001, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington,
which states that any attack on a NATO nation launched from outside that nation shall be
interpreted as an attack on all NATO nations.' 6 NATO-ISAF was initially established as a
peace-keeping mission focused on achieving stabilization in a limited area around Kabul.17
Five years on, NATO-ISAF is now operating in all Afghan provinces except those located
in the eastern part of the country.'S Since assuming control of the southern provinces in
July 2006, NATO-ISAF has actively engaged in combat with Taliban insurgents. Accord-
ing to NATO-ISAF spokesmen on the issue of southern Afghanistan's transition to
NATO-ISAF command, "the capabilities of those forces will be very robust and very ag-
9. S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 5, T 4. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 5.
10. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386, which states that the attacks of September 11 are regarded
"like any other act of international terrorism." Such acts are deemed to be "a threat to international peace
and security." The Resolution continues by stating that "those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbour-
ing the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable." S.C. Res. 1386, supra
not 5. See also GlobalSecurity.org, Transcript: Rumsfeld, Myers Brief on Military Operations in Afghanistan
(Oct. 7, 2001), http://www.globalsecurity.org/imilitary/library/news/2001/10/mil-Ol 1007-usia04.hon.
11. See BROWVNLIE, strpra note 4, at 710.
12. Press Release, Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary General, "To Defeat Terrorism, We Need a Sustained Ef-
fort and Broad Strategy That Unite All Nations," Says Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7985 (Oct. 8,
2001), available at, http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewslD=1746&Cr=afghanistan&Crl=&Kwl=
Security+Council&Kw2=&Kw3=.
13. GlobalSecurity.org, Text: Bush Announces Start of a "War on Terror" (Sept. 20, 2001), http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/09/mil-0 10920-usia0l .htm.
14. GlobalSecurity.org, Text: President Bush Announces Military Strikes in Afghanistan (Oct. 7, 2001),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/10/mil-011007-usia01 .htm.
15. See GlobalSecurity.org, Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
16. Press Release, NATO, Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson (Oct. 8, 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/pOl-138e.htm.
17. See S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 5.
18. SENLIS COUNCIL, Afghanistan's Instability, supra note 6.
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gressive . .. in order to conduct preemptive [sic] operations . . . To recap: more forces,
more robust rules of engagement."19
In principle, if a terrorist attack involves the responsibility of a state, it may, depending
on the circumstances, constitute an armed attack under the terms of the U.N. Charter and
therefore justify military operations by way of self-defense.2° Theoretically then, the nor-
mal legal criteria of what constitutes an armed attack, as established under international
law, would apply. Certainly, the September 11, 2001, attack qualifies as an "armed attack"
under Article 51, and the facilitation role played by the Taliban regime, the de facto gov-
ernment of Afghanistan, justified its legitimate targeting by U.S. forces in self-defense.
However, even in spite of the invocation of Article 51, such operations may become le-
gally problematic where self-defense and pre-emptive operations have an indefinite dura-
tion as the conflict situation alters to such a point that strategic and tactical requirements
exceed the original legal mandate.
Indeed, Article 51 further states that the right of self-defense is valid until the Security
Council has taken appropriate measures to restore peace and security. In the case of Af-
ghanistan, the deployment and expansion of the NATO-ISAF mission operating under a
U.N. mandate could be regarded as such a measure. However, this again raises confusion
concerning the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom operating alongside NATO-ISAF.
Although NATO-ISAF is taking over command of various regional sectors in Afghanistan,
Operation Enduring Freedom continues to conduct its counter-terrorism and counter-
insurgency operations.2 1
Ultimately, while self-defense was seen by many legal experts and policy-makers as a
solid legal basis for the United States to put together a coalition to overthrow the Taliban,
the question now is whether this right to self-defense has not been extended beyond its
original scope as envisaged in Article 51 and in light of the resolutions adopted by the
U.N. Security Council.
The extent to which U.S. strategists have contemplated a reality in which self-defense
and pre-emptive military operations necessarily lead to nation-building seems uncertain.
That it must is reflected in NATO-ISAF's commitment to full-scale combat operations as
part of its stabilization mandate. The legal issue that remains then is not only whether the
authorization of the use of force may be justified beyond the U. N. Charter but also who
makes the determination that such action is necessary. And to what extent is such action
operationally and even genuinely pre-emptive or self-defense at all?
IH. The Military Commissions Act of 2006
In October 2006, President George W. Bush signed into law the Military Commissions
Act of 2006.22 The Military Commissions Act (the Act) is a response to the Supreme
19. LTC R. Cristoni & Col. James Yonts, NATO-ISAF Spokesmen, Speech at Joint NATO-ISAF/CFC-A
News Conference (Feb. 20, 2006), available at http://www.jfcbs.nato.int/ISAFfUpdate/Press_-Releases/
speeches/2006/speech_20febO6.htm?tsfsg=E4670afl3b12a57f4aac5e4b76If4ca. All NATO-ISAF Press Re-
leases and Media Advisories are available at http://www.jfcbs.nato.int/ISAF/Update/media-press.htm.
20. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 4, at ch. 33.
21. SeNuS COUNCIL, Afghanistan's Instability, supra note 6.
22. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
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Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld23 and has been touted by the White House as a
bill that "will save American lives." 24 Generally, the Act established procedures governing
the use of military commissions to try alien unlawful enemy combatants and outlines the
rules and structure that these commissions are to follow. Additionally, the Act sets forth
the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to these commissions. Further, the Act pro-
hibits alien detainees from filing writs of habeas corpus in order to challenge their deten-
tions and makes certain amendments to the War Crimes Act.
One controversial provision of the Act, among many, defines an "unlawful enemy com-
batant" as "a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially
supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful
enemy combatant."25 Critics have argued that this provision means that non-U.S. citizens
detained in the United States after September 11, 2001, could be held indefinitely without
charge or trial and that U.S. citizens deemed as providing material support for hostilities
against the United States could also be held as enemy combatants. 26 Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales, however, has stated that the "Act does not apply to American citizens"
and that the military commissions "may try only alien unlawful enemy combatants." 27
Another provision that has received significant criticism concerns stripping the right of
non-U.S. citizens from filing writs of habeas corpus in the federal courts to seek review of
their detentions. 28 This provision applies to all cases pending on or after the enactment of
the Act, meaning that hundreds of habeas corpus petitions already filed on behalf of
Guantanamo detainees could be thrown out of court.29 The Center for Constitutional
Rights has filed two cases challenging this provision on behalf of twenty-five men detained
at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan and on behalf of Majid Khan, a man allegedly held in
secret by the U.S. government for nearly three years before his recent transfer to
Guantanamo. 30
Yet another provision of the Act concerns the applicability of the Geneva Conventions
under U.S. law and states that "[n]o alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by
military commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source
23. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
24. Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: The Military Commissions Act of 2006, http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2006/10/print/20061017.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
25. Military Commissions Act § 948a(1).
26. See, e.g., Press Release, Center for Constitutional Rights, Bush Signs the Military Commissions Act:
CCR Calls It a Blow to Democracy and the Constitution (Oct. 17, 2006), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/
v2/print.page.asp?ObjID=B5stDu9ZOb&Content=87 1.
27. Online Interview with Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General (Oct. 18, 2006), http://www.white
house.gov/ask/20061018.htnl (responses by Attorney General Gonzales to an online interactive forum, "Ask
the White House," where questions are submitted and answered).
28. See Military Commissions Act § 7(a) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by adding subsection (e)(l) stating:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of
habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been
determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is
awaiting such determination.)
29. See Amnesty Int'l, United States ofAmerica: Military CommissionsAct of 2006-Turning Bad Polity Into Bad
Law, http://web.amnesty.orgAibrary/print/ENGAMR511542006 (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
30. Press Release, Center for Constitutional Rights, supra note 26 (noting that Mo/ammad v. Rumsfeld, filed
on behalf of detainees at Bagram Air Base, and Khan v. Bush, filed on behalf of Majid Khan, are both pending
before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia).
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of rights."31 This provision has received a particularly chilly reception from international
human rights groups, which had contended even before the passage of the Act that the
United States "has shown a selective disregard for the Geneva Conventions and the abso-
lute prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment."
32
Finally, commentators have argued that the provisions of the Act which amend the War
Crimes Act of 199633 allow government officials who authorized or ordered acts of torture
and abuse to be immune from criminal prosecution and liability since the Act redefines
34
acts prohibited under the Geneva Conventions and makes these amendments retroactive
to November 26, 1997. 35 The White House contends that these provisions of the Act
allow intelligence professionals to continue questioning terrorists without the fear of law-
suits filed against them "simply for doing their jobs" and that the Act "[clomplies with
both the spirit and the letter of our international obligations."
36
II. U.N. Update: Non-Proliferation and North Korea
Over the last year, the U.N. Security Council has taken steps to strengthen non-
proliferation efforts. In April 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 167337 on
the issue of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In July, the Security Coun-
cil condemned the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) for test-firing mis-
siles, ordered the DPRK to halt all missile-related activity, and called for the resumption
of the Six-Party Talks. 3s In October, the Security Council reaffirmed its commitment to
non-proliferation and condemned the nuclear test by the DPRK by adopting Resolution
1718.39
A. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1673
This resolution reaffirmed "that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weap-
ons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and
security ... ."4 Acting under its Chapter VII authority, the Security Council expressed
continued support for Resolution 1540 and extended the mandate established thereunder
for two years. 41 Resolution 1540 was "the first international instrument adopted by the
Council dealing with weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related
31. Military Commissions Act § 948(b)(g).
32. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 29.
33. War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
34. See Military Commissions Act §§ 6(b)(1) (amending the War Crimes Act), 6(b)(2) (making the amend-
ments retroactive).
35. See Letter from ACLU to the Senate Strongly Urging Opposition to S. 3930, the Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006 (Sept. 25, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/natsec/gen/26861leg20060925.html.
36. Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet, supra note 24.
37. See S.C. Res. 1673, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1673 (Apr. 27, 2006).
38. See S.C. Res. 1695, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1695 Ouly 15, 2006).
39. See S.C. Res. 1718, T 1, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006).
40. S.C. Res. 1673, supra note 37.
41. See id. 1,4.
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materials in an integrated and comprehensive manner."42 States are also required under
Resolution 1540 to report the steps taken or will take to implement the resolution. 43
B. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1718
After North Korea's nuclear weapon test on October 9, 2006, the Security Council
passed Resolution 1718 less than a week later.4 The Security Council expressed its grav-
est concern over the nuclear test.45 Acting under Chapter VII, the Security Council de-
manded that the DPRK not conduct further nuclear tests and suspend all ballistic missile
program activities.46 The DPRK was also ordered to "return to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards."47
The U.S. representative, John Bolton, declared that the DPRK's announcement of a
nuclear test posed one of "the gravest threat[s] to international peace and security that the
Security Council ha[s] ever had to confront."48
42. Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Security Council Extends for 2 Years Mandate of Committee
Monitoring Implementation of Resolution 1540 (2004) on Mass Destruction Weapons; Resolution 1673
(2006) Adopted Unanimously; Intensified Effort Called for to Keep Non-State Actors from Acquiring Such
Weapons, U.N. Doc SC/8708 (Apr. 27, 2006). See S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
43. See S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 42, 11 9-12.
44. See S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 39.
45. Id.
46. Id. 1 2, 5.
47. Id. 1 4.
48. See Press Release, U.N. Security Council, Security Council Condemns Nuclear Test by Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1718 (2006); Action Prevents Provision of
Nuclear Technology, Large-Scale Weapons, Luxury Goods to Country; Permits Inspection of Cargo to En-
sure Compliance, U.N. Doc SC/8853 (Oct. 14, 2006).
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